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An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.1 and Joshua Weiss2
Introduction
In a recent essay,3 one of us (Pierce) described and analyzed ten empirical studies
of judicial review of agency actions.  With  one  exception,  the  studies  found  that  a  court’s  
choice among six review doctrines had little, if any, effect on the outcome of cases.
Courts at all levels of the federal judiciary uphold agency actions in about seventy per
cent of cases, no matter whether the court applies Chevron,4 Skidmore,5 State Farm,6
Universal Camera,7 or de novo review.8 The one exception was the finding with respect
to Supreme Court applications of the Auer9 doctrine. The Supreme Court seems to take
an extraordinarily deferential approach when it reviews agency interpretations of agency
rules. William Eskridge and Lauren Baer found that the Court upholds 91% of such
agency actions.10
The studies of judicial review of agency actions leave one important void. No
study has previously calculated the rates at which district courts and circuit courts uphold
agency interpretations of agency rules. Thus, we have no way of knowing whether all
courts apply the Auer doctrine in the same extraordinarily deferential way that the
Supreme Court does, or whether applications of Auer by district courts and circuit courts
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reflect instead the seventy per cent affirmance rate that seems to be the norm for all other
doctrines. The main purpose of this article is to fill that void and to answer that question.
In Auer,   the   Court   announced   that   an   agency’s   interpretation   of   an   agency   rule  
“becomes   of   controlling   weight   unless   it   is   plainly   erroneous   or   inconsistent   with   the  
regulation    .    .    .    .”   11 The Court issued its opinion in Auer in 1997, but it quoted from its
oft-cited 1945 opinion in Seminole Rock and applied the Seminole Rock test to the
interpretation that was at issue in Auer.12 Thus, Seminole Rock and Auer announce the
same test. Courts have been applying the Auer/Seminole Rock test for sixty-five years.
Many judges and scholars have characterized the Auer/Seminole Rock test as analogous
to the more recent Chevron test except, of course, that Chevron applies to agency
interpretations of statutes, while Auer/Seminole Rock applies to agency interpretations of
rules.13
Judicial deference to agency interpretations of agency rules might be supported on
at least three grounds. First, deference might be supported by the belief that the agency is
more likely than a court to know what it intended when it issued a rule. We think that is a
weak justification for deference, however. In many cases, the interpretation at issue was
announced so long after the rule was issued that it is unlikely that the agency decision
makers who issued the interpretation played any role in the decision making process that
led to the issuance of the rule. Moreover, most courts, including the Supreme Court,
confer Auer/Seminole Rock deference on agency interpretations of agency rules when the
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agency changes its interpretation as long as the agency acknowledges that it is making a
change and gives plausible reasons for the change.14
The second reason for deference is stronger. Deference is justified because the
agency understands better than a court which interpretation will allow the agency to
further its statutorily-assigned mission. This is the familiar expertise-based comparative
institutional advantage that has long been the primary justification for most doctrines that
instruct courts to defer to agencies. We think this justification for deference is strong, but
we can think of no reason why this justification for deference is more powerful in the
context of agency interpretations of agency rules than in the context of agency
interpretations of agency-administered statutes, agency policy decisions, or agency
findings of fact.   Yet,   the   Supreme   Court’s   pattern   of   decisions   suggests that the Court
confers more deference on agency interpretations of agency rules than on any other type
of agency action.
The third reason is rooted in the differences in the jurisdictional reach of agency
interpretations  and  judicial  interpretations.  Since  an  agency’s  jurisdiction  is  national  and  
a   circuit   court’s   jurisdiction   is   regional,   a   high   degree   of   judicial   deference   to   agency  
interpretations of agency rules furthers the goal of maximizing national uniformity in
implementing national statutes.15 Conversely, a low degree of deference would reduce
national uniformity, since circuit courts are likely to adopt differing interpretations of
agency rules. We also think this justification is strong, but it is no stronger in the context
of agency interpretations of agency rules than in the context of agency interpretations of
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agency-administered statutes. Indeed, Peter Strauss relied on this reasoning to support his
argument for a strong version of Chevron deference in 1987.16
John Manning has argued that courts should not defer to agency interpretations of
agency rules.17 Since agencies are the source of the rules they interpret, Manning argued
that deferring to agency interpretations of ambiguous agency rules encourages agencies
to maximize the ambiguities in the rules they issue. This incentive is powerful because an
agency must use the resource-intensive and time-consuming notice and comment process
to issue a rule, while it is not required to use any procedures to interpret a rule. 18 Thus,
the agency has an incentive to issue a broadly worded rule capable of bearing a wide
range of interpretations and then to use the process of interpreting the rule to make most
important decisions, thereby avoiding the cost, delay, and risks of using the notice and
comment process in that recurring context.
The ninety per cent plus rate at which the Supreme Court upholds agency
interpretations of agency rules suggests that  the  Court  has  not  found  Manning’s  criticism  
of judicial deference to agency interpretations of rules persuasive. The Court provided at
least a partial response to Manning’s concern in its 2006 opinion in Gonzales v.
Oregon,19 however. The Court announced and applied an antiparroting canon in the
context of agency interpretations of their own rules. If an agency issues a rule that merely
parrots   the   relevant   statutory   language,   the   agency’s   interpretations   of   the   rule   do   not  
receive Auer/Seminole Rock deference.
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The antiparroting canon applies to rules that go beyond mere parroting of
statutory language. Indeed, the rule at issue in Gonzales went beyond the statutory
language in some respects, as the dissenting Justices pointed out.20 Thus, the
antiparroting canon deprives agencies of Auer/Seminole Rock deference unless the rule
the agency is interpreting goes beyond the language of the statute by particularizing or
clarifying the statutory language to some significant but uncertain extent. The
antiparroting canon still leaves the agency with some degree of discretion to engage in
the practice that concerns Manning, however. The agency still has an incentive to use the
notice and comment procedure to issue a broadly-worded rule that contains many
ambiguities, as long as the rule clarifies or particularizes the statutory language to the
extent  necessary  to  avoid  the  “parroting”  characterization.  The  agency  could then use the
interpretive process to make most important decisions.
We think the case for judicial  deference  to  an  agency’s  interpretation  of  an  agency  
rule   is   strong   notwithstanding   Manning’s   critique.   However,   we   are   unable   to   identify  
any reason why courts should accord greater deference to agency interpretations of
agency rules than to agency interpretations of agency-administered statutes, agency
policy decisions, or agency findings of fact. Thus, we are puzzled by the Supreme
Court’s  apparent  practice  of  conferring  much  more  deference  on  agency  interpretations  of  
rules than on any other type of agency action.

The Study and Findings
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The main purpose of this study was to determine whether the Supreme Court is
alone in its practice of conferring extreme deference on agency interpretations of rules or
whether district courts and circuit courts also accord some form of super deference to
agency interpretations of rules. Additionally, we designed the study to allow us to
estimate the extent to which judicial applications of the Auer/Seminole Rock doctrine are
affected by the political or ideological perspectives of the judges who apply the doctrine.
For that purpose, we studied the 34 cases in which district courts applied Auer/Seminole
Rock and the 57 cases in which circuit courts applied Auer/Seminole Rock between
January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2001, and the 74 cases in which district courts applied
Auer/Seminole Rock and the 54 cases in which circuit courts applied Auer/Seminole Rock
between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2007.
We chose these two time frames because the first period was likely to involve
review of rule interpretations adopted by a Democratic Administration, while the second
was likely to involve review of rule interpretations adopted by a Republican
Administration. That choice of time periods, in turn, allowed us to make some judgment
with respect to the effect that the political or ideological preferences of judges had on the
degree of deference they accord agency interpretations of agency rules.
The sample of cases we studied—219—is large enough to give us confidence that
our findings are representative of the pattern of decisions in the total population of cases
in which lower courts apply Auer/Seminole Rock. Courts upheld agency interpretations in
76.26% of the cases we studied. There was no significant difference between the rate at
which district courts upheld agency interpretations (75.93%) and the rate at which circuit
courts upheld agency interpretations (76.58%).

6

There also was no statistically significant difference between the rate at which
judges voted to uphold interpretations of rules adopted by agencies headed by members
of the same party as the judge versus the rate at which judges voted to uphold
interpretations adopted by agencies headed by members of the other party. Republican
judges voted to uphold interpretations adopted by a Republican Administration in 77.94%
of cases, while Democratic judges voted to uphold interpretations adopted by a
Republican Administration in 78.57% of cases. Republican judges voted to uphold
interpretations adopted by a Democratic Administration in 74.51% of cases, while
Democratic judges voted to uphold interpretations adopted by a Democratic
Administration in 74.42% of cases.

What Do the Findings Mean?

Our finding that district courts and circuit courts upheld agencies in 76% of cases
in which they applied the Auer/Seminole Rock doctrine contrasts starkly with Eskridge
and  Baer’s  finding  that  the  Supreme  Court  upholds agencies in 91% of such cases.21 The
Supreme Court appears to be alone in the extreme deference it accords agency
interpretations of rules. Our finding suggests that district courts and circuit courts apply
Auer/Seminole Rock deference in about the same manner as they and the Supreme Court
apply the other deference doctrines that have been subjected to empirical study. The prior
studies of judicial applications of the other deference doctrines produced findings of
affirmance rates in the following ranges: Chevron-64 to 81%; Skidmore-55 to 71%; State
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Farm-64%; and, Universal Camera-64 to 71%.22 The overall rate at which district courts
and circuit courts upheld agency actions through application of the Auer/Seminole Rock
doctrine, 76%, is within the range of the findings of the studies of other doctrines albeit at
the high end of that range.
Our findings with respect to the overall rate at which district courts and circuit
courts upheld agency interpretations of agency  rules  fit  well  with  David  Zaring’s  finding
that courts uphold agency actions in about 70% of cases no matter what review doctrine
the court applies.23 Our findings are also consistent with the normative case for judicial
deference to agency interpretations of agency rules we discussed in the introduction to
this essay.24 The case for deference to agency interpretations of agency rules is strong,
but it is no stronger than the case for judicial deference to agency interpretations of
agency-administered statutes, agency policy decisions, and agency findings of fact.
Our finding that the ideological and political preferences of judges had no
significant effect on their votes in cases in which they were called upon to review agency
interpretations of agency rules differs from the findings of many of the studies of judicial
review of other types of agency actions. Many of the studies of judicial review of agency
statutory interpretations and agency policy decisions found that between 15% and 31% of
votes could be explained with reference to the ideological or political preferences of the
reviewing judges.25 By contrast, David Zaring’s  study of 678 votes of judges in cases in
which courts reviewed agency findings of fact produced the same result as our study of
22
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441 votes of judges in cases in which courts reviewed agency interpretations of rules.
Zaring found that the political and ideological preferences of judges had no significant
effect on their pattern of voting in cases in which courts reviewed agency findings of
fact.26
It is possible that the difference between the findings of studies such as Zaring’s
and ours--that   judges’   political   preferences   had   no   significant   effect on their voting
patterns--and the findings of studies that found that judges political preferences had a
significant effect on their voting patterns simply reflects reality. In other words, judges
may not be influenced by their ideological and political preferences when they review
agency interpretations of agency rules and agency findings of fact even though they are
influenced by their political and ideological preferences when they review agency
interpretations of statutes and agency policy decisions. We are skeptical of that
explanation, however. We believe that all judges attempt to engage in review of agency
actions without allowing their political and ideological preferences to influence their
decisions. We can think of no reason why they would be more successful in pursuing that
laudable goal in the process of reviewing some aspects of the agency decision making
process than in the process of reviewing other aspects of that process.
There is another plausible explanation for this difference between our findings
and those of many of the prior studies. Most studies that found a strong connection
between judges’   political   and   ideological   views   and their votes in agency review cases
relied primarily on a methodology different from ours. In those studies, the researchers
first classified each  agency  action  as  “liberal”  or  “conservative”  and  then  compared the
number  of  Republican  judges  who  voted  to  uphold  “liberal”  and  “conservative”  actions  
26

David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 Va. L. Rev. 2317, 2361-62 (2010).

9

with the number of Democratic judges who voted to uphold “liberal”  and  “conservative”  
actions.27
We decided not to use that methodology because we lacked confidence that we
could  classify  accurately  as  “liberal”  or  “conservative”  all  of  the  agency  actions  that  fell
within the large sample of agency actions we studied. We chose instead to use a
methodology that did not require us to characterize the actions we studied. We
categorized agency actions as Democratic or Republican based on the political party that
controlled the executive branch at the time the agency adopted the interpretation at issue.
Our methodology was simple to apply, and our findings are easy for other researchers to
verify or refute. Our methodology is based on the implicit assumption that agencies in
Republican Administrations tend to adopt interpretations of rules that are consistent with
the political and ideological preferences of Republicans and that agencies in Democratic
Administrations tend to adopt interpretations of rules that are consistent with the political
and ideological preferences of Democrats. We recognize that the assumption we indulged
is not universally true, but we believe it is generally true
We are not prepared to argue that our methodology is superior to the methodology
used in the studies that found that the political and ideological preferences of judges had
a significant effect on their pattern of voting in cases in which they reviewed agency
actions. At least in theory, the methodology used in those studies is better than the
methodology we chose. The studies that found a significant difference in voting patterns
based  on  judges’  political  preferences  attempted  to  measure the political and ideological
content of each agency action directly rather than to rely on the imperfect surrogate for

27

E.g., Miles & Sunstein, note 25 supra., at 788; Miles & Sunstein, note 25 supra., at 846; Cross & Tiller,
note 25 supra., at 2168.

10

the political and ideological content of an agency action we chose – identity of the
political party that controlled the executive branch at the time an agency adopted an
interpretation of a rule.
Zaring has expressed concern that at least some of the difference in voting
patterns that other researchers have attributed to the political preferences of judges may
instead be attributable to errors in the inherently difficult process of characterizing
agency actions as liberal or conservative.28 We are not in a position to evaluate that
possibility, but our finding that the political preferences of judges had no significant
effect on their voting patterns in cases in which courts reviewed agency interpretations of
agency rules raises the same question that troubles Zaring.

28

Zaring, supra. note 26, at 2364-65.

11

